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Abstract 
This paper offers a critical examination of two recent American Supreme 
Court verdicts, Masterpiece Cake Shop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission and 
Trump v Hawaii. In Masterpiece the Court ruled against the state of Colorado on 
grounds that religious bias on the part of state officials undermines government’s 
authority to enforce a policy that might otherwise be constitutional. In Trump the 
Court ruled in favor of an executive order severely restricting immigration from 
seven countries, five of which are Muslim majority. Both verdicts raise important 
issues concerning fairness and religious freedom. After examining some of the 
central legal issues in these verdicts I offer a critical assessment of the legal argu- 
ments, focusing on how political value judgments played a crucial role in deter- 
mining the legal outcomes. 
Keywords: Religious Freedom, Religious Toleration, The First Amendment, 
Immigration, Counter-Factual Reasoning in Legal Interpretation 
 
 
In this paper I examine two recent U.S. Supreme Court verdicts in order to 
highlight ways that political factors impact constitutional law with respect to re- 
ligious freedom and immigration policy. The focus is selective in the sense that 
I am not offering a general analysis of religious freedom or immigration policy 
within American law, but instead consider some important issues raised by the 
legal arguments in Masterpeice Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission2 and 
Trump v Hawaii.3 Others have written studies on religious freedom4 and immi- 
gration5  that offer more comprehensive and general perspectives. My focus is 
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on how contemporary political debates impact interpretations of central princi- 
ples in American constitutional law. I am offering an assessment of contemporary 
legal debates about religious freedom and immigration from that perspective. 
At the same time, these recent cases are illustrative of ways that politics impact 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. These verdicts count as reasons to refrain from en- 
dorsing idealized conceptions of legal practice according to which judges merely 
apply law in light of impartial rules for legal argumentation. 
In Part I I present a summary of the legal arguments in Masterpiece and 
Trump. Part II examines differences and overlapping issues in these verdicts. I of- 
fer a critical assessment of the two verdicts, focusing especially on Trump in Part 
III. Finally, Part IV briefly situates these two Supreme Court cases in the larger 
context of debates about legal interpretation. 
 
I 
 
The events leading up to Masterpiece are as follows. A for-profit business 
owner was judged by the state of Colorado to have violated Colorado’s Anti Dis- 
crimination Act (CADA) by refusing to produce a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple. CADA prohibits, “discrimination based on sexual orientation in a place 
of business engaging in any sales to the public and any place offering services 
to the public….”6 As a matter of law, it is important that in this case the business 
owner runs a private for-profit business, rather than a non-profit organization 
or a religious institution. Since the business in question is public and for-profit, 
CADA is clearly applicable. 
The decisive legal issues in this case do not bear on the validity of CADA. 
The Court explicitly claims it is not subjecting CADA to judicial review. Rather, the 
decisive issues center around the following: 
1. Whether agents of the state entrusted to enforce CADA violated the 
plaintiffs right against religious discrimination in their application of CADA. 
2. The First Amendment requirement that government and its agents com- 
ply with a general commitment to religious toleration; when those who make 
or enforce a policy exhibit religious bias government may lose its authority to 
enforce the law. 
3. The relevance of case law—legal precedent—in which citizens chal- 
lenged a state policy on grounds that the policy or its enforcement is motivated 
by religious bias. 
A summary of the central legal issues can be stated as follows: whether evi- 
dence of religious bias counts as a clear violation of neutrality and equal treat- 
ment, both of which are central features to First Amendment jurisprudence. 
One way to make clear that the issue is not the legality of CADA itself is by 
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considering a counter-factual. Suppose members of Colorado’s Civil Rights Com- 
mission had not been found to be motivated by religious bigotry and yet had still 
issued a judgment against the plaintiff. Would the Supreme Court have reached 
a different verdict? Given the legal argument presented by the Court, the answer 
to that counter-factual question is, ‘maybe’. If CADA is constitutional then a fair 
application of its provisions would force business owners to comply with anti- 
discrimination law. 
In the actual case, upon review it became clear that some members of Colo- 
rado’s Civil Rights Commission exhibited a “clear…hostility toward the sincere re- 
ligious beliefs…”7 of the owner of Masterpiece Cake Shop. Mainly for this reason, 
by a seven to two majority the Court overturned the Colorado verdict. Majority 
argues that since some members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ex- 
pressed hostility towards the religious convictions of the owner of Masterpiece 
Cake Shop, the state violated the First Amendment requirements of religious tol- 
eration and state neutrality towards religious convictions. In the words of Major- 
ity legal precedent is also on the side of this judgment, because the Constitution, 
“commits government…to religious toleration,  and  even  the  slight  suspicion 
that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion.”8 
There are clear examples of legal precedent that support Majority’s argu- 
ment. For example in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v Hileah9 a city ordi- 
nance prohibiting the ritual sacrifice of animals within city limits was struck down 
by the Supreme Court. A central premise in the legal argument was that the city 
council members who sponsored the law in question were motivated by a bias 
against a religious minority whose religious practices include the ritual sacrifice 
of chickens. In the larger context of American law and politics it is also significant 
that religious dietary laws in Judaism, Kosher, and Islam, Halal, are accommodat- 
ed. When American courts suspect that one religious group is treated according 
to a different standard than other religious groups, this sometimes results in a 
verdict that invalidates the law in question. Equality before the law is supposed 
to protect citizens from certain forms of bias on the part the state and its agents. 
Inaddition, statutory law, suchas the Religious Freedom Restoration Act(1993) 
imposes an important constraint on policies that impact a religious practice. If a 
policy is challenged on religious freedom grounds, the state must show that the 
policy in question not only serves a compelling state interest (e.g. public health, 
national security), but also that the policy serve that interest in the ‘least burden- 
some’ manner with respect to the religious practices affected by the policy.10 
Although the Masterpiece verdict was pilloried in many quarters, especially 
on the American left, it is important to emphasize that the verdict is a narrow 
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ruling in the sense that the Court does not rule on CADA. To be sure, champions 
of this verdict have invoked it as a big win for religious freedom, often by also 
adding that it shows a Supreme Court that is willing to stem the tide of LGBT 
rights. Yet that is not a fair assessment of what the Court actually argues. It might 
be a reasonable prediction that since some Justices are politically opposed to 
LGBT rights they will in future cases be inclined to erode protections for LGBT 
citizens. Yet Majority does not tell us whether it would have reached a different 
verdict in the event that members of Colorado’s Civil Rights Commission had not 
expressed religious animus in their deliberations about this case. 
In Trump the Court considers an executive order that mostly prohibits migra- 
tion, including for asylum, student visas, tourism, business visas, etc., from seven 
countries, five of which (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen) are Muslim ma- 
jority. Given Trump’s many anti-Muslim statements, both as a candidate, and as 
President, one important legal issue in this case is whether evidence of religious 
animus is a sufficient reason to declare an executive order like this one unconsti- 
tutional. For example, as a presidential candidate, Trump explicitly called for “a 
complete and total shutdown”11 of Muslim migration into the U.S. A second legal 
issue is whether the fact the two non-Muslim majority states (Venezuela and N. 
Korea) were added after previous executive orders faced significant political and 
legal challenges, is relevant, and if so to what extent. In other words one cogent 
legal question is, ‘is the current executive order really just an anti-Muslim immi- 
gration policy that is been modified for strategic political reasons?’ 
Moreover, the fact that presidential authority over matters deemed to be es- 
sential to national security has historically not been subject to significant review 
by the Supreme Court is also relevant to this case. If one argues that in matters 
of national security presidents ought to be given broad authority that cannot 
generally be subject to judicial review, then that is a consideration in favor of 
upholding the executive order. Put one way, this claim is that national security 
considerations outweigh whatever legal weight can be assigned to the allega- 
tion that the immigration policy is motivated by religious bigotry. By contrast, if 
one argues that shameful policies in America’s past, including Chinese exclusion 
policies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,12 and the detainment of Japanese 
Americans during WWII13 are reasons for vigilance against granting too much au- 
thority to government in the areas of immigration and national security, then 
that is a reason to grant more significant weight to president Trump’s comments, 
apparent motives, as well as the symbolic effects of the executive order in ques- 
tion. 
By a five to four Majority the Court upheld the executive order on four main 
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considerations. First, the immigration policy in question falls within the Execu- 
tive’s authority. Second, the policy serves a national security aim in the judgment 
of the Executive. Third, non-citizens do not have legal standing to make a com- 
plaint against the Executive Order on First Amendment grounds. Fourth, the Ex- 
ecutive Order need not be based on religious animus. By these criteria, according 
to Majority, the Executive Order is constitutional. 
Examples of claims on behalf of this verdict include Justice Kennedy’s state- 
ment that, “There are numerous instances in which the statements and actions 
of Government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention.”14 
Justice Thomas addresses the First Amendment issue by claiming, “the plaintiffs 
cannot raise…[a significant] First Amendment claim since the alleged religious 
discrimination in this case was directed at aliens abroad.”15 In my critical assess- 
ment below I will focus mainly on the fourth consideration, which is an interest- 
ing counter-factual test; namely, ‘could the executive order—without changing 
its content—be enacted in a way that is not motivated by religious bigotry?’ 
By contrast, the Dissent considers evidence of religious bias, along with a 
failure on the part of the Trump administration to provide compelling evidence 
supporting the policy on national security grounds, to count strongly against the 
policy. As Justices Breyer and Kagan state, “If the proclamation…was significantly 
affected by religious animus against Muslims, it would violate the relevant statute 
[e.g. prohibitions on policy motivated by religious bias] or the First Amendment 
itself.”16 If the Executive Order is viewed from this perspective, then comparisons 
between the detainment of Japanese Americans during WWII, along with other 
government policies in the past that are now regarded as shameful examples of 
state sponsored bigotry are more apt. Breyer also highlights the fact that in some 
instances visas were granted in response to public criticisms, which suggests that 
public relations considerations make a difference to the visa vetting process. This 
is evidence that national security considerations can in practice be met, because 
presumably in those cases the vetting process satisfied whatever criteria the con- 
sular officials use to determine whether to grant a visa or not. 
Before delving further into Masterpiece and Trump two questions are help- 
ful for framing the context of Majority’s arguments in these verdicts. First, in 
what ways are state neutrality towards religion and equal treatment of religious 
groups and practices relevant in both cases? Possible answers vary. One might 
argue that the constitutional requirement that government comply with a prin- 
ciple of religious toleration applies across a range of state policies, in which case 
Masterpiece along with case law on religious freedom are central legal issues in 
Trump. This position takes a stand against Justice Kennedy’s claim that in some 
areas of law, statements by government and its agents do not count as evidence 
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in favor of subjecting a policy to judicial review. Or one might argue that non-cit- 
izens do not have a reasonable expectation that they will enjoy the First Amend- 
ment protections granted to citizens. In that respect, following Justice Thomas’ 
position, one could argue that the fact that the owner of the cake shop is a U.S. 
citizen, whereas visa applicants are not, is a strong consideration in favor of not 
strictly applying First Amendment standards to Trump’s executive order. And of 
course one might also claim that immigration law is subject to national security 
considerations in ways that render anti-discrimination policies in business and 
commerce less relevant, or perhaps not relevant at all. These are among the is- 
sues that need to be sorted out before making all things considered judgments 
about these two verdicts. 
A second important question is, do the different legal issues in the two cas- 
es—First Amendment jurisprudence in Masterpiece and executive authority to 
set immigration policy in Trump—suffice to vindicate the verdicts as they are ar- 
gued for in the two cases? It is not enough just to show that these differences are 
relevant. For example, one could claim that the differences in these two cases are 
relevant but also that these difference give rise to prima facie legal considerations 
which must be weighed against other considerations before reaching a verdict. 
On this view, one could concede some of the claims in Majority’s argument, while 
also claiming that there are other salient legal considerations (e.g. religious intol- 
erance is incompatible with American law) that outweigh the prima facie consid- 
erations enlisted by Majority. 
Depending on one’s viewpoint, an answer to the first question can deter- 
mine the answer to the second. For instance, if the two domains of law (First 
Amendment jurisprudence and immigration policy) are judged suffi iently insu- 
lated from one another, then it is easier to make the case that there are no incon- 
sistencies in the two verdicts. By contrast, if fairness and equal treatment hold 
across domains of law, then the claim that there is an inconsistency between the 
two verdicts is more compelling. 
One way to develop the view that fair and equal treatment of religious per- 
sons is a general requirement is to enlist a conception of legal authority famously 
defended by Ronald Dworkin in Law’s Empire.17 On Dworkin’s view, one condition 
for legality, where legality means legitimate enforcement of coercive authority by 
means of law, is law’s integrity. Integrity as a legal value consists of a commitment 
to consistency in principle over time, across the various areas of law enforced by 
government. If values such as equality and fairness are included in the idea of 
law’s integrity, then that is a reason to be more sympathetic the dissenting argu- 
ments in Trump. To be sure, the idea of law’s integrity is not so rigid as to entail 
that when legal principle applies across domains of law it always carries the same 
bearing on a legal verdict. Rather, the idea is more akin to a commitment to creat- 
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ing and enforcing law in light of what one imagines is a consistent moral vision 
for a legitimate government. Dworkin’s position is relevant to Trump, because 
one basis for the disagreement between Majority and Dissent in Trump hangs on 
to what extent the principles of religious freedom and religious equality animate 
all of American law, and whether the legal practice of condemning religious big- 
otry when expressed by agents of the state should apply more directly in the 
case of Trump’s Executive Order. 
 
II 
 
One way to critically examine Masterpiece and Trump is consider whether 
their verdicts are in some important respects inconsistent with one another. To 
set the stage for that topic it is important to first sort out relevant respects in 
which the two areas of law, First Amendment jurisprudence and immigration 
policy, differ. The following sketch is composed with that objective in mind: 
 
Masterpiece: Trump: 
 
Area of Law: 
First Amendment Jurisprudence Immigration Law (e.g. INA 1965) 
Applies to Citizens Applies to Labor Migrants, Foreign 
Tourists, Immigrants, International 
Students 
 
Legal Precedent/Statutory Law: 
 
Evidence of religious bigotry Deference to executive authority, 
a reason to subject law or policy to 
especially in matters of ‘national 
strict scrutiny security’ 
 
Examples: 
Wisconsin v Yoder (1972)18 United States v Ju Toy (1905)19 
Church of Lukumi v Hileah (1993). 
 
Though helpful for setting out some of the central issues in the two cases, 
this picture of the two cases needs to be qualified. For example, after considering 
the relevance of case and statutory law to Masterpiece and Trump we can see that 
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there are in fact significant overlapping issues in the two cases. Multiple areas of 
American law are guided by the idea that bias towards persons because of their 
ethnicity, race, or affiliation with a religious tradition is objectionable. This is one 
respect in which a general commitment to toleration animates American legal 
practice. 
Hileah affirmed that a law that on its face can be construed as neutral to- 
wards a religious practice (e.g. a prohibition on animal slaughter within city limits) 
might count as a violation of religious free-exercise. Any one of the following can 
count as evidence that a state policy violates a requirement of neutrality towards 
a religious practice: when lawmakers exhibit animus towards a religious minority 
in drafting a law; when accommodations are granted to some religious groups 
(e.g. for Kosher and Halal for Jews and Muslims) but not others (e.g. ritual animal 
sacrifice of chickens by Santerians); or when a compelling state interest served 
by the law can be fulfilled in a way less burdensome to a religious group. Hileah 
is not unique; it fits an interpretation of religious free-exercise that sometimes 
grants religious groups exemptions from generally applicable law. Wisconsin v 
Yoder is the most well known example, and in that earlier case the Court ruled in 
favor of granting Old Order Amish a partial exemption from state education law. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) ended a quota system in immi- 
gration policy according to which preferential treatment and exclusion was often 
based on nationality (e.g. preference for European immigrants; barriers for non- 
Europeans). In doing so it also makes a strong statement against some historical 
injustices in immigration policy, such as the various Chinese exclusion policies in 
the late 19th-early 20th C. In United States v Ju Toy, Majority argued that immigra- 
tion officials at the port of entry have the authority to deny a person from enter- 
ing the U.S. even if he or she claims to be a natural born citizen. In this case, an 
ethnic Chinese who claimed to be a natural born citizen, was denied a right to 
appeal the immigration official’s decision to not let him enter the United States. 
INA was adopted in part to block policies such as the Chinese exclusion policy 
that the Court upheld in Ju Toy. 
Yet INA does include provisions for national security considerations, and on 
this point, according to Majority in Trump, the law is deferential to presidential 
authority. This point and the fact that the Executive Order, according to Majority, 
is neutral on its face, count in favor of the constitutionality of the travel ban. This 
is an important claim, because if plausible, it offers a potential rebuttal to the 
Dissenting argument. Equal treatment, neutrality towards religious groups, and 
a general commitment to fairness within the law, according to Majority, must be 
somehow balanced against the executive authority of a President. 
According to Majority, executive authority to make policy in areas deemed 
important to national security is the most important factor that distinguishes the 
two cases. This point is worth highlighting, because those who object to the ver- 
dict in Trump can argue more responsibly against the verdict if they concede that 
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Majority’s position is coherent in this respect. A more fair assessment of Trump, as 
I argue below, can acknowledge the national security consideration yet nonethe- 
less show that Majority presents a bad argument. 
 
III 
 
Among the non-trivial legal values that apply across domains of law, fair- 
ness is especially important. Fairness is a general constraint on the rule of law. For 
example, familiar accounts of what principles are necessary for maintaining the 
rule of law, including, consistency between laws, transparency, prohibitions on 
ex post facto law, and treating like cases alike claim that law has a kind of internal 
morality conformity to which is a condition for legality. Lon Fuller famously called 
these principles, legal excellences, the absence of which will render efforts at 
lawmaking that comply with the rule of law impossible.20 From this perspective a 
Supreme Court verdict on one legal question will always bear some relation and 
have some relevance to other verdicts. 
The legal debates over Masterpiece and Trump depend heavily on judgments 
about fairness. It is now settled within First Amendment jurisprudence that when 
law, lawmakers, or law enforcers show evidence of religious bias that counts 
heavily against the law, or the law’s application. By this measure, the verdict in 
Masterpiece is reasonable. One can try to weaken this, as Dissent does, by claim- 
ing that an antidiscrimination policy such as CADA mitigates the unfair motives 
of some of Colorado’s state officials. 
Were these fairness considerations equally central to Trump, we might ex- 
pect a similar kind of argument in that case, perhaps on grounds that the nation- 
al security rationale is weakened when evidence of religious bigotry has been 
established. Evidence of religious bigotry is also a compelling reason to chal- 
lenge the claim that the policy itself is neutral towards religious persons. Majority 
does not deny that fairness matters to immigration policy. When an immigration 
policy seems to identity religious identity as a basis for exclusion that raises the 
question of whether such policy should be struck down. Rather, Majority claims 
that national security considerations and related precedent on executive author- 
ity are evidence that the Executive Order is constitutional. 
One value judgment that is central to the debate between Majority and Dis- 
sent in Trump is how much weight to give to the requirement that government 
must treat persons fairly with respect to their religion in the domain of immigra- 
tion law. I have already noted that Justice Thomas claims that First Amendment 
religious freedom considerations do not apply to non-citizens applying for en- 
trance into the U.S. On his view, that is another legal reason in favor of the Execu- 
tive Order. Yet there is another more interesting claim invoked by Majority. 
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Majority’s argument in Trump raises questions about a familiar issue in phi- 
losophy of law; namely, the salience of counter-factual claims for constructing 
legal arguments, and reliance upon counter-factual claims to endorse or rebut 
interpretations of law. 
As noted above Majority in Trump insists on evaluating the executive order 
not on the basis of President Trump’s many statements about Muslims but rather 
on the basis of whether the Executive Order could be enacted and enforced in 
ways that do not amount to an endorsement of religious bigotry by the state. On 
this point Majority is committed to the following principle: 
 
If government could adopt immigration policy X without being mo- 
tivated by religious bigotry, and if X on this counter-factual rendering is 
constitutional, then X is probably constitutional even if government was 
motivated (up to a point) by religious bigotry. 
 
I add the ‘up to a point’ qualifier, because Majority does claim that religious 
animus is a relevant legal issue in Trump—Majority concedes this point when 
explaining the reasons it agreed to hear the case in the first place. Yet Majority 
concludes that the Executive Order under consideration satisfi s review, because 
national security prerogatives of the President override concerns stemming from 
Trump’s many anti-Muslim comments. The counter-factual test as I formulate it is 
thus a fair way to represent a crucial claim Majority’s argument. Majority is claim- 
ing that the counter-factual test highlights the fact that the Executive Order in its 
current form could have been created without any religious bias. 
There is room for argument on how I am putting this. For example, at one 
point Majority claims it need not consider whether Trump’s public comments 
amount to bigotry, because the national security perspective is decisive. Yet this 
seems to count as evidence for ambiguity in Majority’s argument. We can ask, are 
Trump’s anti-Muslim statements totally irrelevant? Perhaps they are somewhat 
relevant, but secondary to the question concerning executive authority over 
matters of national security. To push his line of thought further, let us consider 
what Majority might have said in light of the following hypothetical example: 
 
Suppose Trump had said of the most recent Executive Order, ‘make no 
mistake, this is a Muslim ban that I am enacting by executive order. But 
there are also national security reasons for this order too. At the same time 
I admit that I added Venezuela and North Korea to the list simply to ap- 
pease some of my critics’. 
 
Under these conditions would the policy be constitutional? Notice that the 
policy could have the same content as the real Executive Order, but the political 
context from which it emerged would be impacted significantly by this sincere 
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expression of religious bigotry. Under this scenario, would Majority construe 
the policy as a different policy, because of the anti-Muslim rationale explicitly 
acknowledged by the state official who adopted the policy? Majority is open to 
being asked this kind of question, because they invoke the counterfactual test 
in order to claim that the Executive Order is in principle neutral. In considering 
this line of investigation, we should carefully examine what this might mean as a 
general principle for legal interpretation. 
These considerations illustrate how the legal status of a law or policy can 
sometimes vary as a result of judgments about the motives of the lawmaker, and 
the apparent rationale behind the law. What from a very abstract point of view 
might look like a policy that satisfies constitutional norms of neutrality and reli- 
gious toleration could in fact be judged unconstitutional if the political context 
in which the law was enacted is considered. Even if national security considera- 
tions tilt in favor of the policy, concerns about religious bigotry are salient. Put 
one way, there are prima facie considerations that in principle might work against 
one another so far as the legal bases for an immigration policy are concerned. 
Too much religious bigotry, and an immigration policy might be struck down; 
some religious bigotry and significant national security considerations, and that 
same policy might be upheld. This illustrates an important feature to the legal 
debate over Trump, because it shows that the Majority’s claim that the Executive 
Order meets the ‘on its face’ neutrality standard cannot reasonably be defended 
as an absolute principle of law. 
In fact, we should be deeply suspicious of attempts by government to de- 
fend law that is being challenged on grounds that it represents a form of state 
sponsored bigotry. Individual persons often deny their biases with various strate- 
gies such as, ‘I am not anti-Muslim, but….’ Government engages in this kind of 
obfuscation too.21 When bigotry is backed by the coercive authority of govern- 
ment the harms are significant and long lasting. Moreover, the wrongs inflicted 
carry an additional insult for having been officially endorsed by the state. Tak- 
ing a cue from Corey Brettschnieder22 we can ask, ‘how should the government 
speak and what should it say?’ From this vantage point, it is hard to defend the 
verdict in Trump. It is unfortunate that the Majority does not consider these fac- 
tors in its deliberation about the salience of Trump’s anti-Muslim comments. 
To summarize this section, I am not claiming that the dispute between Ma- 
jority and Dissent in Trump can be fully explained by differences over the signifi- 
cance of the counter-factual test Majority uses as a tool for judicial review. Yet I 
have focused on this point for two reasons. First it is a significant point of dispute. 
Second, it helps to highlight how central value judgments are to a verdict like 
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the one in Trump. The law speaks more clearly about religious bigotry in the do- 
main of First Amendment jurisprudence, in part due to case law, in part due to 
statutory law. Nevertheless fairness towards religious persons is an issue that cuts 
across areas of law. One of the central debates is over, ‘how much?’ 
 
IV 
 
Many philosophers of law agree that politics impact Supreme Court juris- 
prudence. On this view political value judgments by Justices on the Court impact 
their interpretations of legal principles.23 Among the striking features to the legal 
arguments in Masterpiece and Trump is that they show that political value judg- 
ments play far more than a nominal role in legal interpretation. Sometimes they 
are decisive. 
The tradition of legal realism and more recently critical legal studies challeng- 
es widely held idealizations about legal practice, for example: that the rule of 
law is maintained when judges refrain from making value judgments; that there 
are usually clear legal answers to nearly every legal question; and that reason, 
respect for precedent, along with proper exercises in judicial restraint or judicial 
review provide not only a normative perspective on how law should work, but an 
approximation of how law does work. Though it is beyond the aims of this paper 
to develop and defend a comprehensive conception of law and legal practice, 
the two verdicts in this paper illustrate how value judgments impact interpreta- 
tions of law. 
In his recent paper, “Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme 
Court as Super-Legislature”24 Leiter  demonstrates  some  of  the  striking  ways 
that value judgments impact Supreme Court verdicts. In another recent paper, 
“Phony Originalism”25 Kopplemen documents a number of ways that what tries 
to pass as a neutral, impartial theory of legal interpretation, in fact represents 
a political position on how law ought to be interpreted. These authors present 
compelling reasons to reject embracing an overly idealized conception of the 
rule of law and legal practice. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the American context is more often than 
not an exercise in negotiating value judgments with existing law, law that often- 
times does not provide clear guidance for judges. On this view, there is often very 
little settled law that goes before the Supreme Court—this is true even when 
there are settled principles, such as equal treatment of religious persons in First 
Amendment jurisprudence—because value judgments must often be made to 
decide how these principles apply. Whether the advocate of judicial restraint em- 
phasizes norms such as impartiality and respect for precedent, or a theory of 
 
 
23 Koppleman Andrew M., Phony Originalism, Northwestern University of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011, pp. 1-24. 
24 Leiter Brian, Hastings Law School Journal, 66, 2015, pp. 1601-1616. 
25 Op. ct. 
Jon Mahoney , CAKES AND MUSLIMS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND POLITICS IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LEGAL PRACTICE • (pp 23-36) 
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interpretation which claims judges must be guided by the ‘original meaning’ of a 
law or policy, an examination of legal practice itself offers an alternative perspec- 
tive. 
Some additional recent Supreme Court cases in which it is evident that value 
judgments made a difference in the opinions of various justices include Citizens 
United, Heller, and Obergfell.26 Majority verdicts in these cases upheld the right of 
for-profit corporations to engage in certain forms of political speech, a personal 
right to bear arms, and the right of same-sex couples to receive official recogni- 
tion from government for a marriage. One example of a value judgment is the 
claim that whether the financial resources of corporations will affect public delib- 
eration about politics does not count as a reason for restricting the First Amend- 
ment rights of legal persons, whether natural, or in the form of a corporation. 
Likewise, until Heller, the question, ‘does the Second Amendment grant citizens 
an individual right to own weapons?’ was not settled.27 These cases are clear ex- 
amples of Leiter’s claim that when the Supreme Court takes a case it considers 
legal questions for which the law is generally open-ended. Heller is a good ex- 
ample for what Kopplemen calls ‘phony originalism’, the view that presents itself 
as above contemporary politics, but which is invoked by Justices on the Court to 
defend novel and creative interpretations of law. 
If we concede that much of the debate in cases like Masterpiece and Trump 
centers on attempts to reconcile law with political value judgments, then it is fair 
to evaluate such cases from the standpoint of the value judgment that motivate 
the legal arguments. By that measure, the case against Trump is compelling, be- 
cause the verdict is a license to the Executive to make immigration policy that is 
discriminatory towards a religious group. That is not compatible with religious 
toleration. Moreover, the extreme deference to national security considerations 
does not undermine the complaint that Trump’s Executive Order is a form of 
state sponsored discrimination against Muslim visa applicants. Instead, the na- 
tional security consideration is a state sponsored rationalization that is analo- 
gous to the person who says, ‘I am not anti-Muslim but…’. From this perspective, 
the Dissent is right to point out similarities between Korematsu. In Korematsu, the 
bigotry was directed at an ethnic group. In Trump the bigotry is directed at a reli- 
gious group. Both are instances of state sponsored intolerance.28 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, No. 8-205, 2010; District of Columbia et al v Heller, No. 7-290, 2008; and Obergfell et al 
v Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015. 
27 For a good historical overview, see Amar Akhil Reed, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, Yale University Press, Yale, CT, 
1998. 
28 Research for this paper was conducted during a Fulbright Grant to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2018-19. All views expressed are those of 
the author and do not represent those of the Fulbright Commission. I would also like to thank the organizers and participants at 
the 2018 Politology of Religion Conference at the University of Belgrade. 
POLITOLOGY OF RELIGION: A BIANNUAL CONFERENCE 2018 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
36 
 
 
References 
 
Brettschneider Cory, When the State Speaks What Should it Say? How Democracies can Pro- 
tect Speech and Promote Equality, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2012. 
Breyer and Kagan, dissenting in Trump. 
Carens Jospeh, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013. 
Church of Lukumi v Hileah, 508 U.S. 520. (1993) 
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, No. 8-205, 2010; 
District of Columbia et al v Heller, No. 7-290, 2008; 
Dworkin Ronald, Law’s Empire, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1986. 
Fuller Lon, Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law, in The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, 
Yale, CT, 1977. 
Graham Kevin, The Chinese Must Go: The Racial Oppression of Chinese Americans 1840- 
1965, in Social Philosophy Today, Vol 24, 2008. 
Greenawalt Kent, Religion and the Constitution: Vol 1: Religious Free-Exercise, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1994. 
Immigration and Nationality Act, (1965) 
Justice Kennedy, concurring in Trump. 
Justice Thomas, concurring in Trump.  
Ju Toy v US, 198 U.S. 253. (1905) 
Koppleman Andrew M., Phony Originalism, Northwestern University of Law Scholarly 
Commons, 2011. 
Korematsu v United States, 323, U.S., 214, 1944. 
Leiter Brian, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-Legisla- 
ture, Hastings Law School Journal, 66, 2015. 
Masterpeice Cakeshop v Colorado, Civil Rights Commission No. 16-111, 584 U.S. (2018) 
Obergfell et al v Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, HR. 1308, 1993. 
Trump v Hawaii, No. 17-965, 584 U.S. (2018) 
Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. (1972) 
  
 
